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Abstract
This paper examines institutional determinants of budget policy in Turkey. The discussion is based on an 
analytical framework, inspired by the recent literature, that treats budgetary institutions as mechanisms that 
may  potentially  resolve  agency  and  common pool  problems  in  a  two-stage  principal-agent  set  up  that 
involves citizens, politicians and the bureaucracy. We first discuss the nature of inter-party competition and 
intra-party bargaining and examine how these generate distributive pressures on public resources. We then 
review  the  main  features  of  Turkish  budgetary  institutions,  and,  in  particular,  the  role  of  the  central 
bureaucratic agencies. We conclude with a discussion of proposals for reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public deficits and their finance remain as one of the key unresolved policy issues in Turkey. Turkey is 
generally considered to be a successful reformer, especially because of the significant degree of liberalization 
that has occurred in the 1980s, in trade and finance, both domestic and international. In macroeconomic 
policy, however, Turkey is considered to be less successful, with inflation rates well above 50 percent in 
most  of  the  1990s.  Turkey also went  through a  short-lived  but  quite  severe  crisis  in  1994,  when GNP 
declined by 6 percent. In general, budget deficits and the public donmestic debt are seen as key factors that 
create macroeconomic instability or make the economy vulnerable to exogenous shocks. 
The stock of domestic debt (as a percentage of GNP) has more than doubled since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Table 1). The ratio of public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) to GNP have remained high, between 7-
12 percent in the 1991-97 period. In 1998, the PSBR is estimated to be 8.7 percent of GNP despite an overall 
primary surplus of about 3 percent of GNP. In the second half of the 1990s interest payments have absorbed 
an increasing share of expenditures. On the other hand, the operational deficit, which excludes that portion of 
interest payments required to maintain the stock of public debt constant in real terms, has been quite low 
since 1994. Hence, a good part of interest payments has been absorbed to prevent inflationary erosion of the 
value of public debt.
While the size of the operational deficits suggests that, at least for the time being, fiscal aggregates are not 
out of control, worries remain. The crisis in 1994 still remains in the memories of participants in financial 
markets. There is a widespread belief that the crisis was induced by the government's effort to reduce interest 
rates beyond levels that would be acceptable to financial markets. In that period, the government cancellation 
of auctions of government papers virtually eliminated the market, and eventually precipitated a currency 
crisis.  The  political  dynamics  that  resulted  in  the  policy  mistakes  is  seen  to  remain  largely  operative, 
potentially  making the system vulnerable  to gross mistakes  in  the future as well.  The current  means of 
maintaining fiscal discipline is regarded as fragile: the government is seen as unable to provide fundamental 
public services. In addition, most of the burden of the cuts in expenditures which occurred in recent years 
have been born by public investments. There is a parallel perception that the allocation of public expenditures 
entails  significant  waste.  Patronage,  clientelism  and  politicians'  personal  gains  are  seen  to  dictate  the 
allocation of public funds, rather than a concern for the general public interest.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional dynamics behind budget policy in Turkey. Recent 
literature (Campos and Pradhan, 1996, 1998; von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994, 1995) has 
identified budgetary institutions as important determinants of fiscal policy and outcomes. This paper builds 
on that literature and identifies some of the key institutional variables that seem to be especially important in 
the Turkish context. After reviewing these variables and discuss how they affect budget outcomes, we derive 
our key proposals for reform. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an analytical framework that guides the discussion in 
the rest of the paper. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of budgetary institutions in Turkey. After describing 
the  key  actors  and  their  preferences,  we  examine  the  way  in  which  political  competition  generates 
distributive pressures. We then discuss the extent to which budget institutions contain these pressures, paying 
particular attention to the role of central bureaucratic agencies. The section reviews in detail the procedural 
rules that regulate budget preparation, legislation, implementation and audit. Section 4 discusses expenditure 
outcomes under the current system. Section 5 proposes some elements of reform. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop a simple model of representative democracy. The purpose of the model is to 
identify key problems that arise in assuring that the state behaves in the interests of the citizens. Budgetary 
institutions are conceptualized as mechanisms (or rules, procedures, incentive systems) that may potentially 
resolve these problems in the context of allocation of public resources.
The model outlined here is abstract and omits several factors and key players (such as the media) who play in 
important role in the implementation and monitoring of budget policy in real life. These factors will  be 
introduced later in the sections devoted to the discussion of the Turkish case.
2.1. A principal-agent framework
The  proposed  framework  of  representative  democracy  contains  three  main  types  of  actors:  the  voters, 
politicians and bureaucrats. The state is treated as an entity endowed with the power to design and enforce 
rules. The state is operated by politicians who get elected by voters, and by bureaucrats. Elected politicians 
and bureaucrats together make up public officials, or agents of the state, who are authorized to use the state 
machinery to produce policy.
The primary principals in this simple model of representative democracy are the voters/citizens. Citizens can 
rely on their own (individual and collective) initiatives and the operation of markets for the provision of 
goods and services. However, the provision of some goods and services require collective action that citizens 
are not able to generate, because of well known problems such as free riding and absence of commitment 
mechanisms. These collective goods and services entail not only public goods traditionally defined, but also 
policies, rules and institutions that regulate interactions among the various actors in the public and private 
sectors, and which may potentially increase social  welfare. From a normative point of view, the state is 
treated as an entity that acts as the agent of the citizens and whose purpose, in principle, is to provide these 
collective goods and services. The problem is that since the agents of the state have the capacity to use the 
state machinery to make rules that are binding for all citizens (in other words, state power is coercive), they 
are extremely powerful. The problem of the design of the state is to build and enforce institutions (rules, 
incentives, and accountability mechanisms) to make sure that the coercive power of the state is indeed used 
in the interests of the citizens rather than those of public officials or their affiliates.
The agency relation between the actors of the state and the citizens entails two stages of delegation (Figure 
1). In the first stage, citizens delegate authority to politicians to produce public policy (including policy to 
raise revenues and use these resources to finance the provision of various goods and services). What is 
expected of politicians and of institutions that regulate their behavior is to aggregate diverse demands of 
individuals  and  social  groups,  and  to  on  the  basis  of  these  demands  to  produce  public  policies  which 
maximize social welfare. Given that politicians may have objectives that may diverge from those of the 
citizens, incentives must be created to make sure politicians act in the interest of the citizens. Institutions that 
are  established  to  ensure  that  politicians  act  in  the  interest  of  the  citizens  are  called  institutions  (or 
mechanisms) of political accountability.
While politicians are authorized to design public policy, it is the task of the bureaucracy to implement these 
policies.  Hence  implementation  entails  a  second  stage  of  delegation,  where  now  politicians  act  as  the 
principals and bureaucrats as the agents. In this relation as well,  the interests of the bureaucrats may be 
different  from  those  of  the  politicians.  For  example,  while  politicians  may  be  primarily  interested  in 
transferring a particular resource to a particular constituency in the most efficient and least cost manner, 
bureaucrats may be interested instead in maximizing their budget or their sphere of influence, or they may be 
affiliated with different interest groups, or they may wish to maximize the rents they appropriate, rents which 
become available due to superior information they possess in their fields of expertise. Institutions that ensure 
that bureaucrats act in the interest of their principals are named institutions of administrative accountability.
Institutions  of  political  and  managerial  accountability  include  both  formal  and  informal  mechanisms. 
Possibly the most important formal institution is the constitution, which lays down the basic principles of the 
design the state. These would include both rules that regulate the relations between the citizens and the state, 
as well as those that regulate the agency relations within the internal organization of the state. Rules that 
define various types of government (such as presidential and parliamentary systems) and different types of 
electoral laws are additional examples of institutions of political accountability. Clearly elections are the 
most  important  tools  of  political  accountability  available  to  the  citizens.  The  effectiveness  of  elections 
depends critically on the information available to the citizens with which they can evaluate the performance 
of the politicians and the bureaucrats. In addition, formal and informal institutions that affect party structures 
and the nature of party competition can also seen as part of political accountability mechanisms.
Administrative  accountability  mechanisms include  administrative  law,  norms of  bureaucratic  ethics,  and 
personnel and remuneration policy. This agency relation also is influenced by the amount of information 
available to the politicians about the behavior of bureaucrats.
It should be noted that mechanisms of administrative accountability often try to strike a balance. Even though 
the administration is primarily responsible to the politicians, and mechanisms try to facilitate the political 
monitoring of bureaucrats, they at the same time prevent politicians from abusing their authority over the 
bureaucracy in a way that weakens or undermines their accountability towards citizens. Hence in modern 
public sector management the bureaucracy is protected from excessive political discretion. The bureaucracy 
is expected to behave under a code of professional ethic which sometimes may encourage bureaucrats to act 
in ways which contradict the immediate interests of politicians, but which nevertheless agree with the public 
interest.
Similarly, one of the critical dimensions of the relation between the politician and the bureaucracy, which 
will be especially relevant for the discussions below on Turkey, is the ability of the politicians to appoint, 
promote and demote bureaucrats. Ability to appoint bureaucrats on the one hand allows politicians to work 
with persons who share similar social objectives. Hence, it is an effective means of discipline and control. On 
the other hand, excessive use of this power may have an adverse effect on the formation of professional and 
bureaucratic norms. In many countries, there are formal or informal rules that restrict the scope of political 
appointees. As will be discussed below, keeping administrative agencies relatively independent of political 
influence may be especially important in the case of those which play a key role in the budget process.
The first general problem that needs to be tackled in the design of the state, then, arises because interests of 
the agents typically diverge from those of the principals. This is a standard agency problem. Note that at both 
the political  and administrative levels, informational problems that make it  difficult  for the principals  to 
monitor  the agents are potentially  substantial.  This enables agents to  appropriate  substantial  amounts of 
informational rents. Accountability mechanisms try to minimize the impact of this divergence of interests, by 
providing appropriate rules and incentives. Note, however, these rules are typically severely "incomplete" 
since it is impossible to take account of all future contingencies. Hence design of appropriate incentives in 
both stages is difficult.
2.2. Collective dilemmas
The second general problem is that representative democracy itself suffers from collective dilemmas that the 
state is supposed to resolve. Various forms of this problem have been studied in recent years (e.g. Weingast, 
Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981; Chari and Cole 1993; von Hagen and Harden, 1995, Dixit and Londregan 1996). 
It is useful to distinguish two aspects of this problem. The first relates to the norms and institutions that 
regulate inter-party competition. For example, to the extent that political competition is carried out on the 
basis of promises of distribution of rents to constituencies, that is, to the extent that distributive politics is the 
main axis of political competition, more pressure will be generated on public resources. Dixit and Londregan 
(1996) have shown that distributive politics is akin to a non-cooperative game among political parties. Even 
though each party would like to promise less to voters, competition drives them to promise more1. If, on the 
other hand, the main instrument of political competition is efficiency in the production of public goods, then 
one might conjecture that this sort of competition would generate less distributive pressures on the budget.
The  second relates  to  intra-governmental  common pool  problems.  The  typical  problem here  is  that  the 
benefits  of  public  expenditures  are  often  localized  to  specific  constituencies  (often  dubbed  "electoral 
districts" in the literature), whereas the financing of public expenditures often entails taxation (including 
inflation taxes) on a national scale. Therefore, each member of the cabinet (or member of parliament that can 
influence budget policy) internalizes all the benefits of public expenditures but only part of their cost. Such 
fragmentation  also  results  in  excessive  expenditures  (for  example,  von  Hagen  and  Harden,  1995).  The 
severity of this problem depends on the nature of budgetary institutions,  as emphasized in the literature 
(Campos and Pradhan, 1996 and 1998, von Hagen, 1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1995), but also on the 
organizational and leadership structures of political parties (nature of intra-party bargaining, for short), as 
will be discussed in detail below. In addition, the form of the government (that is, whether there is a single 
party or majority government) is also expected to play a role.
The design of most states entail  central  agencies that  can potentially help contain the centrifugal  forces 
generated by collectives dilemmas. These are agencies (often associated with the ministry of finance) which, 
compared to politicians are less subject to distributive pressures, and whose task is to act as the custodians of 
public monies. Regulations which provide central agencies with decision making or agenda setting authority, 
or which enhance their bargaining power can potentially limit distribution of public resources in exchange for 
political support2.  The literature on budgetary institutions emphasize "strong ministries of finance" as an 
important institutional mechanism to overcome common pool problems in public expenditures.
Agency and common pool have three important potential  welfare implications. The first  problem is that 
collective dilemmas associated with distributive politics, whether originating from inter-party competition or 
from intra-party or intra-cabinet bargaining, tend to generate excess expenditures and a deficit bias (Chari 
and Cole, 1993; Velasco, 1998). Second, they tend to result in allocational inefficiencies, in the sense that 
public goods are underproduced and there are excessive transfers (political rents) to special interest groups 
(Persson,  Roland and Tabellini  1997)3.  Distribution  of  political  rents  often  generates  additional  welfare 
losses, since, due to political constraints, these have to be made through inefficient fiscal instruments4. Third, 
there are potential welfare losses associated with cost effectiveness in policy implementation (bureaucratic 
rents).
The problems described above are potentially present in all representative democracies. However, countries 
differ  in  the extent  to  which  institutions  exist  that  contain  the  adverse  consequences  of  both  collective 
dilemmas  and  agency  problems.  Efficiency  requires  the  effective  operation  of  both  political  and 
administrative accountability mechanisms. It is possible to identify several features of such institutions. First, 
they should be able to moderate between the diverse distributive demands imposed on the state by different 
constituencies, and constrain political responses to these demands. Second, they should be able to limit the 
discretionary  powers  of  the  state  actors,  especially  their  capacity  to  distribute  public  resources  to  gain 
advantage  in  political  competition.  Third,  they  should  encourage  the  production  of  public  goods  and 
discourage particularistic transfers and political and bureaucratic rents. Fourth, they should encourage the 
generation of correct information in the system, so that principals can better monitor the agents.
2.3. The role of budgetary institutions
This  paper  treats  budgetary  institutions  as  one  of  the  most  important  mechanisms  of  political  and 
administrative accountability. These institutions regulate interactions between the various actors (citizens, 
politicians and the bureaucrats) in the allocation of public resources, with the objective that these resources 
are allocated and used in  the most  efficient  manner.  The framework presented above,  and the potential 
problems identified suggest three (not necessarily independent) criteria of efficiency:
1)  fiscal  discipline:  resolve  collective  dilemmas,  constrain  deficit  biases  so  as  to  achieve  and  maintain 
macroeconomic stability
2) allocative inefficiency: ensure that public resources are allocated so as to maximize social welfare (for 
example, constrain political rents and distributive transfers in favor of public goods)
3)  cost  efficiency:  deliver  public  goods  and  services  in  the  least  cost  manner  (for  example,  constrain 
bureaucratic rents)
For the purposes of this paper, we find it useful to classify budget rules under two headings. First, budgetary 
institutions ensure the production, capture and dissemination of various types of information. Three aspects 
of this is especially relevant. First, they can generate information for the citizens on how public resources are 
used  by  politicians  and  bureaucrats.  The  presumption  is  that  such  information  enhances  political 
accountability by enabling citizens, for example, to make more informed choices during elections and vote 
out of office those politicians who are deemed to have misused these resources. In order to be useful, such 
information would need to be presented in formats which facilitate access and interpretation (for example, 
accordance with generally accepted reporting requirements). Second, information related to the activities of 
agents at each level of the principal-agent hierarchy within the state can be made available to the respective 
principals  so  as  to  facilitate  monitoring.  Third,  it  is  presumed  that  better  and  more  comprehensive 
information helps contain the adverse effects of collective dilemmas. When the budget does not provide 
timely and comprehensive fiscal data, the amount of public resources which individual agents of the state can 
control and allocate as they see fit is likely to increase, since the overall impact of such increases is not well 
detected. Overall, such these rules can be said to ensure transparency.
Second, budget institutions establish specific procedures that need to be followed in the allocation of public 
resources, including the specification of what each actor can and cannot do at each stage. These rules can 
help ameliorate both agency problems and collective dilemmas. For example, it is often argued that setting 
the overall magnitude of expenditures before deciding on expenditure composition may contain the deficit 
bias5. The requirement that all expenditures during a year be authorized by the legislature through an annual 
budget law may enable politicians to resist distributive demands during the year by reducing discretionary 
authority over public resources (and enhance fiscal discipline). Various types of internal controls may limit 
the extent to which agents misuse public resources. Hence budgetary institutions serve as vehicles of control  
and commitment. 
3. TURKISH BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
3.1. The key actors and basic principal-agent relations
Turkey has a parliamentary system of government. The authority to legislate lies with the Grand National 
Assembly  (hereafter  the  parliament)  which  uses  this  authority  in  the  name  of  the  nation  (to  whom 
sovereignty belongs). The first stage of delegation therefore involves the delegation of legislative authority 
from the nation to the parliament. Members of parliament (MPs) are appointed through elections. Except for 
several interruptions due to military takeovers, multi-party elections have existed since the 1950s.
According to the constitution, one of the primary duties of the parliament is tomonitor the cabinet and the 
ministers6. The cabinet is headed by the prime minister, who is appointed by the president. The norm here is 
that the president appoints the leader of the party that has the largest number of MPs, although recently 
leaders who are perceived as likely to form a cabinet that is expected to survive a vote of confidence have 
also been appointed. The rest of the members of cabinet (the ministers) are selected by the prime minister, 
most  frequently  from among the governing parties'  MPs. The cabinet is  collectively responsible  for  the 
conduct of the "general policy" of the government. Each of the ministers is answerable to the prime minister 
and is responsible for the administrative units under it. As in most parliamentary systems, most laws drafted 
and proposed to the parliament originate with ministers and the cabinet.
The authority to spend money is delegated by the parliament to the cabinet through annual budget laws. The 
draft budget is presented by the cabinet and enacted by the parliament. Parliamentary oversight of public 
expenditures is carried out by the High Court of Accounts (HCA), which presents its audit (Statement of 
Conformity) to the parliament following the end of the fiscal year. Concurrently, the cabinet presents its 
Final Accounts Bill, which is voted by the parliament. 
The  cabinet  implements  its  policies  through  administrative  agencies  (the  bureaucracy).  Administrative 
agencies report to their respective ministries. There are various forms of agencies. In addition to ministry 
departments or "general budget agencies", there are annex-budget agencies, state economic enterprises, and 
agency types funded by extra-budgetary funds and revolving funds. The annual budget covers the general 
and annex-budget agencies and a number of extra-budgetary funds. 
A few qualifications can be made regarding the agency relation between the parliament and the cabinet. In 
most  discussions  of  distribution  of  power  in  parliamentary  democracies,  the  cabinet  is  regarded  as 
accountable to the parliament. As mentioned above, this is true in the Turkish case as well, since oversight of 
the  cabinet  is  identified  as  one  of  the  constitutional  duties  of  the  parliament.  However,  since  in  most 
parliamentary systems MPs rarely defect from party policy on important legislative issues, and since in the 
case of majority governments parties that compose the government also hold the majority of seats in the 
parliament,  the  oversight  capacity  of  the  parliament  is  very  restricted.  Majority  governments  can  enact 
whatever  law  they  wish.  At  least  in  the  case  of  majority  governments,  the  oversight  capacity  of  the 
parliament essentially boils down to the opposition's right to access information and make that public. The 
same is true for budgetary institutions. A majority government essentially can enact any budget that it likes. 
The reason that parliamentary oversight may enhance overall accountability is that, at least in principle, by 
requesting that expenditures be authorized through a budget, and by requesting, ex-post, a settlement of the 
annual  fiscal  accounts,  parliamentary  oversight  provides  better  information  to  citizens  and  other 
stakeholders7. Likewise, the importance of the external audit provided by the High Court of Accounts lies 
ultimately in evaluating the quality and validity of the information disclosed by the government, and making 
that evaluation public.
Central control agencies play an important role in the preparation and implementation of the budget, though 
they  are  not  constitutional  entities.  These  are  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MOF),  the  Treasury,  the  State 
Planning Organization (SPO), the State Personnel Office, and, to an extent, the Central Bank. The MOF 
contains  the  general  directorate  for  budget  and  fiscal  control  (expenditures),  the  general  directorate  for 
revenues (taxes), the general directorate for accounting, the property office and the state supply office. It has 
primary  responsibility  for  the  preparation  and  the  implementation  (appropriations  release  and  internal 
controls) of the budget. Cash and debt management are under the responsibility of the Treasury, which has 
been separated from the MOF in the 1980s. The Treasury is responsible to the Prime Minister; however, in 
practice it is run by a minister of state8. The SPO is responsible for authorising public investment projects. 
Hence, it has an important role in the preparation of the investment component of the budget. The SPO is 
also an important actor in general macroeconomic management and prepares the annual economic programs9. 
As with the Treasury,  the SPO is organized under the Prime Ministry, but it  is often headed by a state 
minister. The annual programs provide some key variables (inflation and exchange rate targets) which are 
used by the rest of the actors
in preparing the budget. A fourth important actor is the Central Bank. Even though the central bank does not 
take a direct role in the budget process, it is a key player both because central bank advances are potentially 
an important source of finance, and also because of the impact of monetary and exchange rate policy on 
markets  for government securities.  Finally,  the State Personnel Office is responsible for recruitment and 
salary policy.
The  division  of  key  responsibilities  among  various  central  agencies  creates  a  serious  problem  of 
fragmentation in budget policy. This problem is potentially aggravated by the fact that in the last decade most 
governments have been coalition governments. The High Planning Board, headed by the prime minister and 
consisting  of  the  central  agencies  as  well  as  key  ministers  engaged  in  economic  policy  is  a  forum of 
information exchange and collective decision making. However, the amount of coordination it provides is 
limited. As will be discussed in more detail below, the degree of inter-agency coordination is an important 
determinant of budget policy. 
The next step in the analysis of budgetary institutions is to describe the objectives and incentives of each of 
the players described above. We start with politicians.
3.2. Political competition and the generation of political liabilities
Electoral  competition  in  Turkey is  characterized  by a  deep-rooted  legacy of  "populism",  or  distributive 
politics, whereby the use of public resources to generate political support has become the main instrument 
through which a political party tries to gain advantage over its competitors. Since this is the predominant 
source of distributive pressures on the budget, it is worth examining it in some detail.
A candidate running for office faces two sets of competitive challenges. First, she has to compete within her 
party to become a candidate in (local or national) elections. Second, she has to compete with candidates from 
other parties to win elections. For intra-party competition, she has to gain the support both of the party leader, 
and of critical networks within the party. The first set of liabilities are generated when the candidate seeks the 
support of local and party notables, and of delegates who play an important role in the formation of party 
hierarchies across the country. Such support is generated in return for promises of patronage, or transfers, or 
procurement contracts, promises that would be realized in case the candidate is successful in gaining political 
influence.  At  the second stage,  the  candidate  needs the support  of  voter  constituencies.  Party  and local 
notables play an important role in this process as well, because of their organizational and networking skills. 
Promises of transfers to the electorate (for example, in terms of higher agricultural support prices in rural 
areas, or granting ownership of illegally occupied land in urban shantytowns) form the second large set of 
liabilities.
Note that this process of liability formation suffers from collective dilemmas as well. In principle politicians 
would prefer to bear less liabilities since that would increase their command over public resources. However, 
their resistance is severely limited by the threat of competition, much in the spirit of Dixit and Londregan 
(1996).  From  the  perspective  of  constituents,  the  end  result  of  distributive  demands  is  likely  to  be 
macroeconomic stability and inflation. However, given that politicians are likely to be responsive to the 
distributive demands of the rest  of the interest groups, each individual group will  find it  optimal to put 
pressure on politicians. 
It is often argued that political leadership may be an effective tool in resolving collective dilemmas within an 
organization.  Parties  whose  leadership  structures  provide  leaders  with  extensive  power  to  use  selective 
incentives may be able to internalize the externalities associated with collective dilemmas and protect the 
collective interests of the party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, especially chapters 4 and 5). The nature of this 
delegation can be thought of as an incomplete contract, or a set of rules that determine the actions that leaders 
can take under particular circumstances, or the nature and degree of discretion that they can assume. It has 
often been argued that political parties in Turkey have "oligarchic" leadership structures, that party leaders 
demand absolute loyalty from their  members, and that they play an important role in deciding on party 
policy, in the internal advancement of party members and in determining which of the candidates will run for 
office (Turan 1995). However, this dominance comes at a significant price: In return for complete loyalty, 
party leaders have to cater to the distributive demands of their followers, especially those who represent 
significant  networks of support10.  This reciprocal web of interdependence for particularistic  benefits  has 
become the main glue that holds parties together. As a result, party leaders' incentives to pursue the collective 
interests of the party are weakened by the features of intra-party bargaining.
Features  of  both  inter-party  competition  and  intra-party  bargaining  make  politicians  very  responsive  to 
distributive demands. This tendency is further reinforced by expectations that guide voter behavior. Populism 
in Turkey has historical roots in the development of multi-party democracy and is deeply ingrained in the 
political culture (Heper and Keyman, 1997; Sunar, 1990). Distributive demands by constituencies are more 
than straightforward expressions of pursuit of self-interest. In addition, responding to constituency demands 
for government support have been seen as a primary  duty of the state. The state has been perceived as an 
"institution that guarantees the livelihood of broad strata of the population" (Önis and Webb, 1994: 135; see 
also Heper, 1985).
3.3. The role of the central agencies
Overall,  compared  to  politicians,  the  central  agencies  are  much  less  direct  stakeholders  in  distributive 
politics. In addition, there is within the central agencies an overall negative sentiment against populism and 
distributive  politics11.  For  example,  the  central  agencies  are  likely  to  be  more  inclined  to  maintain 
macroeconomic stability,  or  to resist  gross violations of allocative efficiency (e.g.  in the case of blatant 
transfers of rents to interest groups). Potentially, then, the central agencies may play an important role in 
restraining the adverse effects of distributive politics. Alternatively, they can help insulate politicians from 
distributive pressures. Whether or not they play this role effectively depends on their bargaining power and 
which decisions are delegated to them during the budget process. 
Among the various factors that influence their bargaining power, two seem especially important: The first is 
the personalities of top appointments (say at the level of undersecretary and deputy undersecretary). Strong 
and competent personalities increase agency independence, and expand the range of decisions that are likely 
to be less influenced by short term political priorities of the government. From the point of view of the 
cabinet, appointments of strong and competent personalities to central agencies may potentially act as an 
instrument of strategic delegation and enable politicians to be more resistant against distributive demands.
The second factor (not necessarily independent from the first) is the degree of inter-agency coordination. 
Division lines among central agencies (and among bureaucratic agencies in general) are thick, and procedural 
mechanisms for inter-agency coordination and cooperation are weak. Even though preferences of the central 
agencies are likely to be more or less aligned on issues such as fiscal discipline, there are also potential 
conflicts over distribution of authority. In other words, each agency would like to maximize its influence 
over public resources and policy decisions, a conflict which is potentially zero-sum. The fact that agencies 
which were originally organized under a single entity (MOF) have been separated in the recent past has 
exacerbated problems of trust between agencies12. These make cooperation on non-conflictual issues difficult 
and fragile as well. 
Inter-agency coordination has also been weakened by the way responsibility for economic policy has been 
distributed in the cabinet. Since 1991, all governments except one have been coalition governments. There 
have often been two or three ministers responsible for economic and budget policy. Until recently, most of 
these Ministers were appointed by the senior ccoalition partner. Hence, the central agencies used to report to 
ministers from the same party, and the senior partners of coalition governments used to have control over 
fiscal management. This has changed under the last few governments. Under the government before last, for 
example, the SPO and the Treasury reported to ministers from the senior partner, but the minister of finance 
was from the junior partner. However, even when agencies report to ministers from the same party, this does 
not  guarantee enhanced coordination.  There  have been  cases  in  recent  history  where  problems between 
central agencies have risen due to lack of coordination and personal strife between ministers belonging to the 
same political party. This can be seen as a direct consequence of the fact that expertise in specific policy 
areas often has very low weight in ministerial  appointments. Party leaders are more likely to appoint as 
ministers people who are loyal or who belong to key networks. As a result, coherent public policy is often not 
among ministers' top priorities, or even when it is, ministers are not necessarily well equipped to deal with it.
The degree of coordination among central agencies has increased over the years. Close cooperation between 
the treasury and the central bank in debt management is well recognized and appreciated by the financial 
markets.  Furthermore,  the  SPO,  the  Treasury,  and  the  MOF  work  together  during  budget  preparation. 
However, such coordination is not fully institutionalized, and results from the personal efforts of bureaucrats. 
More importantly, the impact of these efforts is weakened by other shortcomings of the budget system, 
discussed below. 
3.4. Budget coverage
The term budget coverage is used to cover both dimensions of the budget process mentioned above (section 
2.3). The first is coverage in terms of commitment and control, that is, whether activities which use public 
resources are carried out with prior authorization from the parliament through a budget law. The second is 
coverage in terms of the transparency function of the budget. That is, irrespective of whether authorized by 
the parliament, do all forms of expenditure of public resources get reported or accounted for?
The coverage of budget laws in Turkey is limited in both respects. An important part of public expenditures 
is  undertaken  without  requesting  the  approval  of  the  legislature  (Figure  2).  As  a  result,  parliamentary 
oversight over the executive is further diminished. The fact that the government can spend public resources 
outside the budget both increases the government's discretion and reduces transparency since it becomes 
much more difficult for the public or the opposition to monitor how public resources are spent.
Important  expenditure  items  not  covered  in  the  budget  include  the  state  banks'  quasi-fiscal  operations 
(especially subsidized credit), subsidies provided through SEEs (especially for agriculture), tax expenditures, 
contingent liabilities that arise from Treasury guarantees offered to debt issued by public agencies (such as 
local  governments),  capital  commitments  (commitments  for  future  expenditures  on  investment  projects 
approved by the SPO). There are also extra-budgetary funds and over three thousand revolving funds that are 
not covered by the budget. 
Some of these off-budget activities are reported ex-post by the SPO. The annual programs contain data on 
"public sector balances" which document receipts, expenditures and borrowing requirements for key public 
sector  entities  (agencies covered by the consolidated budget,  financial  and non-financial  state  economic 
enterprises,  local  governments,  social  security  institutions,  revolving  funds  and  extra-budgetary  funds). 
However,  important items such as contingent liabilities,  part  of quasi-fiscal activities of state-banks (see 
below), and tax expenditures are not reported at all13.
Quasi-fiscal activities of state banks and non-financial SEEs are especially important in terms of size, in 
terms of the amount of discretion they provide to politicians over public resources, and in terms of their lack 
of transparency14. More concretely, budgetary coverage of quasi-fiscal operations is limited in two respects: 
First,  typically quasi-fiscal expenditures are spent without prior appropriations from the budget. Most of 
these activities generate "duty losses" which need to be compensated by the Treasury. Appropriations to 
cover these duty losses are made ex-post. Hence, these expenditures are very discretionary, and are carried 
out with incomplete or no prior authorization from the parliament15. Second, coverage is limited in terms of 
provision of information on the use of public resources. Even ex-post budgetary allocations against duty 
losses do not fully compensate for them, so they accumulate over the years, sometimes at very high interest 
rates. Hence, not only some quasi-fiscal activities are not reflected in annual budgets (or even in total PSBR) 
for a number of years, in addition, at any point in time, the reported stock of domestic debt underestimates 
the total stock of liabilities of the government. Ultimately, these liabilities are recognized when The Treasury 
(typically) issues off-budget "non-cash" securities against them16. The stock of such non-cash government 
securities have remained at 4-5 percent of GNP in the 1993-97 period17.
There is practically no information generated to evaluate the performance of the spending agencies. Hence, 
the  role  of  the  budget  in  generating  mechanisms  for  administrative  accountability  is  limited  to  formal 
compliance  requirements.  There  is  also  no  information  with  which  policy  outcomes  (welfare  impact  of 
expenditures) can be evaluated. Many ministries produce annual reports, which contain some information on 
policy outputs (amount  of  goods and services provided),  but  the budget process makes no use of  these 
reports.
3.5. Features of budget preparation, legislation and implementation
Specific  procedures  followed  in  budget  preparation,  legislation,  and  implementation  are  also  important 
determinants of budget outcomes (von Hagen, Campos and Pradhan). A summary of the budget cycle in 
Turkey is provided in Table 2.
The budget preparation process in principle could provide a forum where the cabinet, with the help of the 
central  agencies,  establishes  the  strategic  priorities  of  the  government.  The  purpose  here  would  be  to 
aggregate over the different interests represented by the line ministries, both so as to maintain aggregate 
fiscal discipline, as well as to ensure that resources are allocated to areas that the government identifies as 
political priorities.
The  literature  suggests  several  institutional  measures  to  reach  these  goals.  It  is  often  argued  that 
strengthening  the  position  of  the  prime  minister  and  the  minister  primarily  responsible  for  the  budget 
(normally the MOF) against those of the line ministries is likely to help achieve or maintain aggregate fiscal 
discipline, since both are more likely to protect the collective interests of the government. Setting or agreeing 
on aggregate ceilings on expenditures in advance of bargaining over their composition is sometimes seen as a 
procedural measure that serves a similar  purpose18.  Another institutional device is a medium term fiscal 
planning  framework that  would provide  estimates  of  future  costs  of  alternative  policies  (called  forward 
estimates in Australia, see Campos and Pradhan 1996, 1998). This would not only increase the quality of 
cabinet decisions, but also enhance transparency, and, consequently, the accountability of politicians to the 
citizens. Finally, a process of evaluation of the welfare impacts of alternative policies and an information and 
reporting system to support it would enhance allocational efficiency.
None of these institutions exist in Turkey. The system works as follows (Table 2). Bids are collected from 
central ministries, and then a bargaining takes place between line ministries and the central agencies. Fiscal 
aggregates are established as a result of agreements reached in this bargaining process. In some cases where 
serious cuts in the bids are needed (for example, due to a short-term stabilization program) these are carried 
out across the board. The budget preparation process entails no serious evaluation or prioritization. When the 
system  works  well  (eg  when  the  central  agencies  are  given  bargaining  power,  due,  say,  to  strong 
undersecretaries), the preparation stage can produce realistic budgets which aim to maintain fiscal discipline.
It has been suggested that the features of the budget legislation process may also have an impact on aggregate 
fiscal discipline (von Hagen 1992, von Hagen and Harden 1994). The legislation stage has two components. 
First  the  budget  proposal  is  presented  to  the  parliamentary  committee  on  planning  and  budgeting.  The 
committee can propose any types of  amendments  on the budget.  The government  (be it  single-party  or 
coalition) holds the majority in the committee. The composition of this committee has varied over the years. 
In some exceptional years this committee has consisted of deputies who have expertise on economic and 
fiscal issues. However, in general, membership in the committee serves as a step of intra-party promotion, 
and expertise has not been an overriding criterion in appointments into the committee. In recent years there 
have been examples where members of the committee have made marginally increased appropriations for 
their electoral districts. 
The second stage is discussion in the general assembly and enactment by the parliament. The features of this 
process in Turkey are essentially similar to those that have been suggested to increase fiscal discipline (e.g. 
von Hagen, 1992). The constitution forbids amendments to decrease revenues or increase expenditures. In 
fact, in most cases proposed budgets are enacted without significant changes.
The stage that really determines budgetary outcomes in Turkey is implementation. Appropriations and cash 
releases are at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, respectively. Due to high inflation 
both become extremely politicized and the whole implementation process becomes a grand bargaining game 
between the central  agencies,  the rest  of the bureaucracy,  ministers,  members of parliament  and others, 
including local governments.  In particular,  the MOF and the Treasury are under constant pressure from 
politicians to favor their expenditure items over others' in releasing appropriations or cash. 
More importantly, there are various ways in which actual expenditures may exceed appropriations identified 
in  the  budget  law.  The  most  obvious  way  of  doing  that  is  through  supplementary  budgets,  which  a 
government  can  easily  enact  as  long as  it  has  a  majority  in  the  parliament.  This  mechanism has  been 
extensively used in the past (almost every year in the last decade) so that now it has become a norm. Relative 
to budget laws enacted before the beginning of the fiscal year, supplementary budgets generate much less 
public debate. The expectation that supplementary budgets can be passed through the parliament without 
much difficulty, and without much public debate, makes budget preparation a less than completely serious 
activity. The budget law has lost its potential commitment value.
In addition to supplementary budgets, there are additional means through which actual expenditures may 
surpass  appropriations  in  the  budget  law.  A  prominent  mechanism  is  requesting  "supplementary 
appropriations" in the Final Accounts Bill. Some of these complementary appropriations are allowed under 
the Public Accounting Law. Such "legal supplementary appropriations", as they are called in Turkey, are 
very small  in magnitude,  and only a  small  class of  expenditures are eligible  for this  kind of  treatment. 
However, in the past, governments have requested and obtained complementary appropriations for interest 
and  personnel  expenditures  as  well,  without  any  clear  legal  basis.  Overall,  however,  compared  to 
supplementary budgets, the magnitude of supplementary appropriations has not been very large and have 
reached at most a few percentages of total expenditures.
The fact that the commitment value of budget laws is weak is evident from ex-post gaps between budgetary 
appropriations and realized expenditures. These gaps were about 4 percent of GNP in 1994 and 8 percent in 
1997. Moreover, the deficit seems highly correlated with the gap (Figure 3).
3.6. External Monitoring
Formal external audit of the budget is done by the High Court of Accounts. The constitution authorizes the 
Court of Accounts to audit, on behalf of the parliament, the revenues and expenditures of all public agencies 
covered  by the  consolidated budget.  The  audit  of  the  budget  is  done  primarily  through a  Statement  of 
Conformity. HCA audits are not fully effective. First, the audit is restricted to compliance. The Court does 
not have a tradition of producing information on the allocative and cost efficiency of expenditures. Second, 
an important portion of public expenditures is outside the domain of the Court. The audit of state economic 
enterprises is carried out by the High Audit Board, which reports to the Prime Minister, and therefore is in 
principle  open to  political  influence.  Gonul  (1997)  estimates  that  about  half  of  expenditure  transactions 
(amounting to about 14 percent of public expenditures) escapes the HCA's audit. Third, and perhaps more 
importantly, the Statement of Conformity does not create much public debate and the HCA has not been very 
active in creating one. As a result, the HCA reports do not have much bite. In a few occasions, the HCA has 
warned members of the parliament of the illegality of some supplementary appropriations requested by the 
government, but has not been successful in either stopping the parliament from granting them, or in creating 
a public awareness on the issue.
There are two additional sources of external monitoring that are becoming particularly important in Turkey: 
financial markets and the press. Financial markets in Turkey have been liberalized in the 1980s, and the 
Turkish  lira  is  fully  convertible  since  the  1989.  As  emphasized  by  Campos  and  Pradhan (1996),  open 
financial markets potentially exert discipline on fiscal policy. In addition, the domestic banking system is the 
primary holder of government securities. Since 1994, when an attempt by the government to bypass the 
financial  system by resorting to  central  bank advances resulted in a major financial  crisis,  the financial 
system is recognized by governments as an indispensable partner in financing deficits and rolling over the 
domestic debt. This has allowed the central agencies in taking albeit small steps in reducing the degree of 
discretion  in  public  finances.  For  example,  in  the  last  two  years  the  treasury  has  started  announcing 
borrowing programs that specify the timing and magnitude of auctions of government securities that are to be 
held in the near future19. The degree to which these programs can actually discipline public expenditures 
depends on the costs (as perceived by the government and the bureaucracy) of deviating from them. While 
we do not have estimates of these costs, our current impression is that the Treasury has been successful in 
convincing governments of the benefits of adhering to these programs.
Freedom of the press is, and has been for quite some time, fully operational on matters of economic policy. 
However, freedom of the press does not by itself imply effective monitoring and pressure by the public20. 
There are at least two additional conditions that need to be met. The first is an educated press coverage of 
economic policy issues. The level of expertise on economic policy issues has increased significantly in recent 
years. The second is an ability to focus public discussion on key issues. The problem of achieving efficiency 
in the allocation of public resources is not necessarily a straightforward problem. In order to enhance public 
awareness, critical themes such as excessive discretion, transparency and the coverage of the budget need to 
be placed on the agenda of public opinion. The press can potentially play an important role in focussing 
public attention on a number of key variables and concepts to monitor and evaluate fiscal policy. The Turkish 
press is becoming morecompetent in carrying out that function as well.
In  recent  years,  there  have  been  several  occasions  in  which  the  press  has  played  a  significant  role  in 
introducing  and  publicising  attempts  by  the  bureaucracy  to  improve  transparency  and  maintain  fiscal 
discipline. The Treasury borrowing programs mentioned above were greeted with significant media support. 
Newspapers have been active in monitoring agricultural support prices, and specifying, most possibly on the 
basis  of  leaks  from the  central  agencies,  thresholds  above  which  such  prices  would  reflect  "populistic 
behavior". In 1998, as a result of prodding from the central agencies, the government promised to refrain 
from issuing a supplementary budget.  The media has been active in keeping that  promise in  the public 
agenda. To our knowledge, this was the first time that the media made an issue out of supplementary budgets. 
Similarly, the idea that excessive political discretion over the allocation of public resources may harm the 
public interest is being discussed more frequently by economic columnists.
4. EVALUATION OF BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
In this section we evaluate budgetary institutions in Turkey using the framework developed in Campos and 
Pradhan (1996). Their framework identifies three levels of assessment: aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic 
prioritization  and  technical  efficiency.  Following  them,  at  each  level  we  consider  the  key  institutional 
arrangements, accountability and transparency mechanisms.
4.1. Aggregate fiscal discipline
A. Macro framework and coordination mechanism
The annual programs provide a limited macro framework. There is no multi-period framework or forward 
estimates. The program is published and available to the public.
B. Dominance of central ministries
Even though formally  the  prime minister  and  the  MOF are  central  figures  in  the  budget  process,  their 
positions are weakened by the general prevalence of distributive politics.
C. Formal constraints
There are no formal constraints on budget deficits or on the level of domestic or foreign debt. There is a 
constraint on the amount of central bank advances that the Treasury can utilize.
D. Hard budget constraints
In principle expenditures cannot exceed appropriations in the budget. However, in practice this constraint is 
rendered meaningless through the use of supplementary budgets. There are no formal hard budget constraints 
on state economic enterprises.
E. Comprehensiveness of the budget
Very limited. See figure 3.
Regarding accountability, two of the mechanisms mentioned by Campos and Pradhan exist in Turkey: Ex-
post reconciliation is done through the Final Accounts Bill, which is not closely monitored by the public. 
Openness of financial markets exists fully, as mentioned above. Sanctions for central ministries do not exist.
4.2. Strategic prioritization
A. System for comparing medium-term costs of competing policies
Both the Treasury and the SPO use macro-econometric models, however these are useful for comparing 
alternative macroeconomic scenarios, not for evaluating the allocative efficiency of fiscal expenditures. The 
SPO has expertise to evaluate investment projects, and follows key sectors closely. They do carry out some 
prioritization regarding investment  expenditures but  in  a  de-facto manner.  In  recent  years,  due  to  fiscal 
deterioration, the share of investment in budgetary outlays has been reduced significantly.
B. Comprehensiveness of the budget
Very limited. See figure 3.
C. Flexibility of line agencies
Almost non-existent.
D. Breadth of consultations
There is almost no feedback from civil society, except for public pressure as reflected in the media. However, 
there is  significant pressure that politicians do take into account, that  results in distributive politics.  For 
example, there is always pressure for higher agricultural support prices, or public wages and salaries. 
E. Use of objective criteria
None.
Reporting on outcomes and ex-post evaluations occur very rarely, if at all. The technical capacity of the 
parliament is limited as well. Hence, the accountability and transparency mechanisms identified by Campos 
and Pradhan (1996) do not exist.
4.3. Technical efficiency
A. Civil service pay and merit based recruitment/promotion
In general,  civil  service pay is lower than private sector standards. The role of merit  in recruitment and 
promotion in central  agencies is  quite important. Line ministries are much more instruments of political 
patronage.
B. Managerial autonomy of line agencies 
Does not exist.
C. Predictability of resource flow
Both appropriations and cash release are highly politicized. However, in 1998 the MOF and the Treasury 
tried to coordinate on a release program. 
As mechanisms to encourage accountability and transparency in technical efficiency, Campos and Pradhan 
list clarity of purpose/task, introduction of fixed-term contracts for chief executives, creation of financial 
accounts  and  audits  for  line agencies,  client  surveys  and contestability  in  service  delivery.  To our  best 
knowledge, none of these exist for line ministries.
5. EXPENDITURE OUTCOMES
The crisis in 1994 has affected the relation between the politicians and the central agencies. The spectre of 
major macroeconomic disruptions or financial crises seems to have convinced politicians to delegate more 
responsibility to the central agencies in the design and conduct of budget policy. In turn, the central agencies 
have used this opportunity to restrain public expenditures and prevent major macroeconomic disruptions. As 
a result, fiscal aggregates, as measured by operational deficits, have remained under control (Table 1). On the 
other hand, the central bureaucracy has not been able to engage in major reforms or drastic policy initiatives. 
A few additional factors may have facilitated the maintenance of fiscal discipline over the last few years. 
First,  payments  on  the  accumulated  domestic  public  debt  have  greatly  reduced  resources  available  for 
distribution.  Here  we  also  suspect  that  a  prevalence  of  a  type  of  money  illusion  has  probably  helped 
bureaucrats. The notion that a good part of interest payments in fact is primarily absorbed to compensate for 
the inflationary erosion of the stock of debt is somewhat new and foreign to politicians. Our sense is that the 
realization of  the  fact  that  fiscal  aggregates  have been under  control  is  likely  to  increase  pressures  for 
distributive politics. In fact, especially the Treasury seems to have been careful in not creating a celebratory 
atmosphere over the performance of the last two years. Second, the fact that economic policy making has 
been fragmented at the cabinet level may have actually helped the hands of the bureaucrats. The increase in 
the  degree  of  fragmentation  within  the  cabinet  has  coincided  with  increased  efforts  for  inter-agency 
coordination, and has helped central agencies in resisting demands for distributive transfers.
This sense of enhanced aggregate fiscal discipline has been gained at the expense of substantial costs in terms 
of various forms of inefficiencies. The first type of inefficiency is the under- provision of public goods and 
services (defined in general terms, including public policies) and over -production of particularistic goods 
and services.  For  the  case  of  Turkey,  the  most  evident  public  good that  is  under-produced is  possibly 
macroeconomic stability. In addition, it has become increasingly clear in the last few years that the state has 
faced  severe  difficulties  in  carrying  out  its  most  fundamental  functions,  including  such  things  as  the 
provision  of  law,  order  and  justice.  Expenditures  for  social  services  such  as  education  and  health  are 
extremely low. The share of investments in total outlays from the budget has decreased from 19-20 percent in 
1981-87 to less than 10 percent in the 1990s.
The distribution of public resources as rents, besides resulting in under-production of public goods, entails 
additional losses. We conjecture that inefficiencies of the sort examined by Coate and Morris (1997) are very 
large in  Turkey.  To give one example,  the government  cannot  simply give lump-sum subsidies  to  their 
contractors  that  support  them.  Instead,  these  have  to  be  disguised  as  public  projects  that  consume real 
resources,  but the social  values of which are low. Indeed, there have been a large number of stories of 
unfinished public projects whose main beneficiaries are contractors. Similarly, it is well known that support 
prices for agricultural products have large distortionary effects (Kasnakoglu and Cakmak, 1998; nash, n.d.).
Finally, we suspect that cost efficiency in the provision of public goods and services is very low. News of 
corruption in public procurement have exploded over the last few years. This is one area where we suspect 
that there is extensive collusion between politicians and bureaucrats. While corruption in public procurement 
reflects major weaknesses in procurement regulations, it is facilitated by the compliance oriented execution 
of external audit.
6. ELEMENTS OF REFORM
Reform of budgetary institutions should have two immediate objectives. Thefirst is to reduce the degree of 
discretion in expenditure policy. The second is to increase the degree of comprehensiveness and transparency 
of fiscal accounts. Realization of these objectives would both increase fiscal control and constrain public 
expenditures, enhance the credibility of announced fiscal policy, and increase public confidence.
There are several measures that can be undertaken to reach these objectives. The most immediate step is 
making the fiscal  implications of quasi-fiscal operations transparent.  A partial  approach to  this  problem 
would require closer monitoring of these operations, and instituting a system of flow of information that 
would generate the fiscal implications of these operations without a delay.
A  more  comprehensive  approach  to  increase  transparency  would  overhaul  the  government  reporting 
requirements altogether. The most effective means of doing so would be to publish a balance sheet of the 
state, with its supporting documents21. Initially, the balance sheet may capture current assets and liabilities of 
the central government. The balance sheet can be accompanied with additional financial tables that capture 
contingent liabilities, commitments and cash flow. The primary data for the balance sheet is available in the 
Treasury and in the agencies that carry out quasi-fiscal operations. It is expected that treasury guarantees 
form the bulk of contingent liabilities, hence the primary data for that is also available. The main source of 
commitments is probably the stock of programmed and ongoing public investments, the record of which is 
available in the SPO.
The second element of budget reform focuses on increasing the comprehensiveness of the budget itself. This 
is essential to reduce discretionary expenditures. In most cases the current legal framework delegates the 
authority to generate duty losses to either the cabinet of the relevant agency. Hence, quasi-fiscal operations 
are undertaken with no link to the budget. The budget should impose limits on the maximum amount of duty 
losses that can be generated within the year. These limits should be treated like all the appropriations in the 
budget and should not be overridden by cabinet decisions. More generally, the budget should cover all public 
expenditures22.
Introduction of a medium term fiscal program is an another potentially important component of reform. In 
the Turkish context,  this  would serve two purposes.  First,  it  would play a  crucial  role  in  clarifying the 
medium term revenue and expenditure implications of current policies. This helps increase discipline on the 
current budget preparation process. It has been argued that the practice of providing forward estimates, and 
reporting ex-post deviations from these estimates has helped increase the accountability of politicians and 
bureaucrats  in  countries which have reformed their  budgetary institutions  (Campos and Pradhan,  1996). 
Second, it would enhance the degree of coordination among the central agencies. Currently such coordination 
takes place during the preparation of the annual programs (published by the SPO) and the annual budgets. A 
medium term fiscal  program would act  as  a  more effective mechanism to coordinate  the strategies  and 
expectations of the central agencies.
Another element of reform is the de-politization the appropriations and cash rationing process. This can be 
achieved by having the MOF and Treasury jointly draw up an appropriations and cash release program and 
make that public. Some progress towards a coordinated and programmed release of expenditures has been 
made in the recent past.
The  most  important  tools  of  discretion  in  the  current  system  are  supplementary  budgets.  Restricting 
supplementary budgets would require constitutional amendments23.  However even an announcement of a 
commitment to avoid supplementary budgets may have some signalling value, especially if accompanied by 
additional actions that increase the transparency of fiscal accounts, and reduces the discretionary powers of 
the executive.
Most  of  the  measures  mentioned  above  target  the  establishment  of  aggregate  fiscal  discipline  and 
consolidation of advances made in this regard over the last few years. One can also mention a second set of 
measures  which  primarily  aim at  increasing  the  allocative  and  cost  efficiency  expenditure  policy.  This 
requires better monitoring of public expenditure programs and evaluation of their impact on social welfare. 
The absence of evaluation in the current system not only generates cost and allocative inefficiencies, but also 
makes  strategic  prioritization  at  the  budget  preparation  stage  extremely  difficult.  As  a  result,  whenever 
budget cuts have been necessary, they have been carried out across the board, without a strategic focus. 
Hence,  absence  of  evaluation  also  further  complicates  the  establishment  of  aggregate  fiscal  discipline. 
Substantial capacity for evaluation already exists, especially in the SPO, which houses a large number of 
sectoral experts. This expertise can be easily mobilized for evaluating specific programs that consume a large 
amount of resources. 
The recent behavior of the central agencies strongly suggests that they are likely to be willing participants in 
a comprehensive reform program. They could even play a leading or guiding role under a benign or reform-
minded government that is willing to delegate responsibility to the central bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
bureaucratic  initiatives  under  an  obstructionist  government,  or  a  government  with  strong  tendencies  of 
distributive politics, are likely to remain timid or unsuccessful. Any reform strategy that aims at substantially 
changing the existing inter-agency distribution of power or authority (as could be the case, for example, if 
one intended to reduce the degree of fragmentation) is likely to face significant resistance from the losing 
agency. Such resistance would probably result in an effective veto, unless the government in question is very 
strong, a prospect that does not seem to be likely in the near future.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the institutional determinants of fiscal policy outcomes in Turkey. It has argued that 
the nature of political competition generates strong tendencies for distributive politics, which creates strong 
pressures  to  use  public  resources  for  political  benefits.  The  budgetary  institutions  accommodate  these 
tendencies  in  several  ways.  Budget  laws  cover  only  a  portion  of  government  expenditures,  providing 
politicians with substantial amounts of discretionary public resources that can be spent outside the budget. 
Budget laws are not binding and supplementary budgets are frequently enacted. Independent external audit is 
weak. There is little evaluation of the welfare impact of public expenditures. Fiscal discipline, whenever 
achieved, is mainly established by across-the-board cuts in current expenditures and substantial reductions in 
public investments. 
The central agencies are important players in the budget process, and especially after the crisis in 1994, have 
played a crucial role in preventing runaway budget deficits and major macroeconomic disruptions. They have 
also engaged in several recent initiatives to enhance transparency and reduce discretion. However, they are 
not  likely  to  engage  in  a  comprehensive  reform  effort  unless  they  perceive  some  support,  or  at  least 
acceptance from the politicians. 
The paper argues that enhancing transparency is a crucial step in the reform of budgetary institutions. This 
would entail expanding budget coverage so as to account for all activities using public resources. We propose 
that the most efficient means of achieving transparency is through the publication of a balance sheet of the 
government and supporting financial  reports.  Introduction of a medium term fiscal  program would both 
enhance transparency and increase the degree of coordination among central agencies. The most efficient 
means of restricting the use of supplementary budgets is to change the constitution. However, our impression 
is  that  announcements  of  commitments  to  refrain  from issuing  supplementary  budgets  in  a  number  of 
consecutive  budget  cycles  would  be  an  effective  means  to  increase  public  awareness  and  increase  the 
political cost of issuing supplementary budgets for future governments as well.
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Mediterranean Development Forum, Marrakech, Morocco, September 3-6, 
1998. We are grateful to Ersin Kalaycioglu and Dani Rodrik for helpful comments.
End Notes
1  We do not intend to imply that redistribution is always undesirable. We would like to distinguish redistributive rents resulting 
purely from constituency politics (and which would be considered as wasteful by most citizens), from comprehensive redistributive 
social programs (which, for example,  may target the poor) which would be seen by most  citizens as socially beneficial.  The 
distinction is admittedly vague for general purposes, but the framework is most useful for cases where the distinction is evident and 
easily recognized. Dixit and Londregan (1996) make a similar point.
2 If the central agencies are to play this role, then they must not collude with politicians. One factor which may prevent collusion is 
an institutional culture (a collective preference, or a code of ethics) that favors the "public interest",  and which is critical of 
distributive politics. 
3 Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) show that under some conditions, including that the social welfare function is symmetric, 
the socially optimal policy would entail no distributive transfers, and all resources would be used to finance the production of 
public goods at the first-best level. They further show that most political institutions fail to generate the socially optimal policy.
4 In a recent paper Coate and Morris (1997) show that, when information is imperfect, governments may choose to use inefficient 
instruments to transfer public resources to special interest groups because they would like to disguise such transfers and present 
them as public goods that benefit ordinary citizens.
5 As will be discussed below, there is some controversy on this proposition.
6 The executive consists of the Presidency and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), including the prime minister. The presidency, 
even though quite influential in other aspects of government (especially recently) has a more minor role in budget policy.
7 Other important stakeholders are financial markets and the media. See below.
8The number of ministers of state has increased over the years. Many have been created by party leaders in order to reward high-
ranking party loyals and notables.
9The SPO also prepares "five year economic plans". While the plans do provide a general direction, they are not binding, and do 
not play an important role in policy discussions.
10 Also, party notables' threat of exit (more correctly, the threat of joining another party) has proven to be very effective in making 
leaders responsive to their demands, as evidenced by "markets of parliamentarians" that surface every so often.
11We might add that recruitment in central agencies is done on a merit basis, and the general level of competence is higher than the 
rest of the bureaucracy.
12 There are certain issues that immediately thickens the division lines and instigates turf battles. For example, whether or not the 
Treasury should remain in its current status, or should be returned to the MOF is one such issue. In general, any proposal that 
disturbs the status quo by redistributing power from one agency to another is sure to be vetoed by the losing agency. Distribution of 
credit and blame is also a potential source of conflict.
13 Not only to the general public, but the government itself does not have a clear idea on the magnitude of most of these items.
14 Some components of quasi-fiscal activities of state banks are discussed in detail in Atiyas, Bal-Gündüz, Emil, Erdem and Özgün 
(1998).
15  There  are  some  quasi-fiscal  activities  (such  as  some  subsidized  agricultural  credit  lines)  that  are  not  even  eligible  to  be 
considered as duty losses. Losses associated with these particular activities need to be financed by the public agency in question.
16  The Treasury also engages in debt restructuring with the other public entities, including the Central Bank. These off-budget 
operations transfer resources to public entities (especially SEEs) against equivalent obligations to the Treasury, typically to service 
debt liabilities to third parties.
17 In the same period, total domestic debt has increased from 13 to 20 percent of GNP (see Table 1). Atiyas et.al. estimate that as of 
the end of 1997, the stock of duty losses at two state banks (that is, claims on the Treasury awaiting some sort of repayment 
through budgetary allocations or non-cash securities) were about 3.6 percent of GNP. In the same year, the flow of duty losses 
generated by these two banks, net of payments by the treasury, was about 0.9 percent of GNP.
18  This is a controversial issue. Even though most public sector financial management experts argues that so called "top-down" 
budgeting enhances aggregate fiscal  discipline,  Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) argue that  what resolves the common pool 
problem is not the sequencing of budget decisions (aggregate first, components later) but the centralization (delegating the decision 
on the aggregate budget to an agenda setter).
19  While initially these were announced on a monthly basis, a six-month program was announced in July 1998, and a 3-month 
program in January 1999.
20  For example, the press may collude with government officials on mutually beneficial issues and to the detriment of public 
interest. Such collusion occurs frequently in Turkey.
21  For a discussion of basic principles that should guide the the design of a balance sheet of the state in the Turkish context, see 
Emil (1997).
22 In recent years budget laws have provided upper bounds on the amount of guarantees that can be advanced by the Treasury. The 
effect of these bounds have been limited because the cabinet was given the authority to increase these limits.
23 For example, one proposal could be to require a super-majority in the parliament.
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